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By Vanessa Bowden and Terry Leahy
Background
The 2007 election of the Labor Party to the Australian government after 11 years of a conservative Liberal Party government was widely held up as a turning point for the debate about climate change (Flannery 2008; Peters 2008; Daily Telegraph 2009). The Rudd government ratified the Kyoto Protocol and began preparations for the introduction of a national emissions trading scheme (Wong 2008; Coorey 2009). Following a turbulent public debate about how much the scheme would cost, the legislation was withdrawn, the Labor leader replaced, and the new leader – current Prime Minister Julia Gillard – went to the 2010 election promising there would be no price on carbon (Sydney Morning Herald: 2010). This was reversed when the government realised they needed the support of the Green Party to form a minority government, and a new version of the legislation – a carbon tax – was planned and has now been implemented. The unpopularity of this tax has been a major problem for the Labor party.
Australia has not been alone in hesitating to act on climate change. Attempts to implement climate change mitigation policies have resulted in intense public debate about the accuracy of climate science and the costs of transitioning to a low carbon economy. Opposition to climate change policy, often led by conservative organisations, has commonly focussed on the supposed weakness of the science and the predicted damage from climate change policies (McCright and Dunlap 2000: 510). Those calling for action have been labelled as emotional, ill-informed and extreme (Jennaway 2008; Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman 2008: 352). In popular Australian media, this opposition has been promoted by a variety of journalistic opnion leaders. As Boykoff and Boykoff (2007) have argued, these attacks on climate science and policy may have been part of the reason for weak public concern.
Business leaders are in a powerful position as spokespeople about the potential economic impacts of any legislation. As Guy Pearse (2007) has shown, they have had both a public and policy development role in the climate change debate, although greenhouse intensive industries have usually had a greater clout as stakeholders. This research uses interviews with 40 business leaders in the Hunter Region of NSW as a case study investigating how business leaders from a broad section of industries are responding to climate change. The research finds that while levels of concern about climate change vary amongst participants, there are important areas of commonality in the way participants frame the debate. Environmentalists and scientists are distrusted and the growth economy is sacrosanct. While the problem of climate change may be recognized there are limits to acceptable remedies. All proposed measures must be cost effective, even if this is at the expense of protecting the climate. A cautious approach is seen as more reasonable than the recommendations of environmentalists and climate scientists.
The class framing of climate concerns
There are a number of sociological perspectives that treat business leaders as members of a ‘social class’ in order to understand their reponse to climate change. These analyses have proved useful in understanding our data but what has been missing is an analysis of the relationships between business leaders and the class from which warnings of environmental risk emanate; that is the class which includes scientists and the environmentalist movement.
Beck (1995a; 1995b; 2009) suggests three ways of looking at the class issues that inform the likely response of business leaders to environmental risk.
The first of these, emphasized in Beck’s early writings (1995a; 1995b), is to foresee the current context as a dissolution of old class categories. For Beck:
… the struggle between classes over the distribution of goods has been usurped by a struggle over the distribution of "bads", such as pollution and toxic waste. (Howes 2002: 328)
These ‘bads’ are ‘mega-hazards’ which ‘cannot be delimited spatially, temporally, or socially: they encompass nation states, military alliances and all social classes’ (Beck 1995b: 1). In this context, traditional class allegiances are breaking down (Beck 1995a; Bauman 2000: 148-165; Gandy 1997). These mega-hazards ‘cut across the social order’ with the potential to ‘split the business camp’ (Beck, 1995a: 28). In this approach, the working class and capitalists of particular industries are pitted in struggle against analogous class coalitions. Parties which benefit from an industrial activity which causes an environmental risk are ranged up against parties which suffer from that problem – for example the the wine industry of the Hunter region opposes the coal mining industry over issues such as damage to ground water supplies, dust, noise pollution and aesthetics.
In a related take, a second viewpoint foresees business support for environmental measures coming from a business community which is likely to benefit from the imposition of environmental controls, a version of ‘ecological modernization’ theory: ‘the global economy itself sees decisive action to counter climate change as a source of new opportunities for markets and growth’ (Beck, 2009: 102)
In a third way of conceiving the current context, Beck theorizes an opposition between global capital on the one hand and citizen movements on the other. The power of business is being undermined by coalitions of politicians, scientists and grass roots social movements.
Global risks empower states and civic movements because they uncover new sources of legitimation and options for action for these groups of actors; on the other hand, they disempower globalized capital because the consequences of investment decisions give rise to global risks, destabilize markets and awaken the power of the sleeping consumer giant. (Beck 2009: 66)
The third of Beck’s perspectives fits quite closely with marxist writings on these topics.
Within a marxist perspective (Baer 2008; Foster 2011; Kovel 2007), the business community opposes measures to contain climate change to defend the growth economy and profits. Business scepticism about climate science is an ideological response to defend class interests, threatened by environmental controls. As in Beck’s writings, ‘citizen movements’ which challenge capitalism to defend the environment are not described in class terms. Kovel writes that the immediate impacts of ecosystem decay caused by the capitalist mode of production ‘are what energizes the resistance embodied in the environmental and ecological movements’ (Kovel 2007: 155). The Indymedia movement, comes from ‘collectives of radical media activists’ (Kovel 2007: 256). For Foster, Clark and York, ‘the weight of environmental disaster is such that it would cross all class lines’ (2010: 440). What these activists share is their age: ‘The most hopeful development … is the meteoric rise of the youth-based climate justice movement’ (Foster, Clark & York 2010: 440).
Another aspects of marxist analysis acknowledges and accounts for the alliances between business and the working class in opposition to environmentalist movements. As Kovel puts it, the success of capitalism lies in separating workers from the means of production and from each other. This has become ‘sedimented into a the labor movement itself which, being dependent on jobs within existing capitalist workplaces, often shares with capital resistance to environmental protection’ (Kovel 2007: 256). In this view, the task of ‘red socialists’ is to ‘reach out to wage labourers’ with an enhanced consciousness of the need for change away from the growth economy (Kovel 2007: 257).
Some version of the marxist analysis certainly fits some of what has taken place. For example the link between climate scepticism as a media phenomenon and business funding (McRight & Dunlap 2010); the resistance of both business and the public to the kinds of political measures which climate science regards as adequate (Hamilton 2010; Leahy, Bowden & Threadgold 2010) the public opinion studies which show ambivalence about measures to contain climate change and defend the spending power of ordinary people against any threats to increase taxes or the costs of energy to the consumer (Leahy, Bowden & Threadgold 2010); the link between party political allegiance and views on climate which is found in countries like Australia and the USA (Dunlap & McRight 2008). Beck is also correct in explaining the ways in which business groupings may end up in alliance with the environmental movement on some issues. The businesses manufacturing sustainable energy technologies and those badly affected by environmental damage are positioned to take a nuanced view. Yet as we shall see, our data suggests quite strong limits to these departures from mainstream business opinion.
While in combination, Beck and the marxists make a useful analysis of the divisions (and possible alliances) between business and the environmental movement, our own research suggests a new interpretation of this situation. Both Beck and the marxists tend to treat the social movements resisting environmental damage as representing ‘civil society’ rather than as coming from a specific class position. Yet this representation fails in two ways – it is not a very accurate description of the social location of these movements and moreover, as our research here shows (see also Gow and Leahy 2005; Leahy 2003) it is not how ‘environmentalists’ and ‘scientists’ are perceived by the rest of society.
Other approaches to class may help us to draw this social landscape more carefully. John and Barbara Ehrenreich (1979) argue that modern capitalism (since the early twentieth century) has increasingly relied upon a mediating ‘professional managerial class’ (PMC) whose role is to provide technical advice to capitalists and to manage and guide the working class. Their role and function ‘may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations’ (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich 1979: 12). The PMC and the working class ‘share an antagonistic relationship to the capitalist class’ (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich 1979: 17). However the PMC are resented by the working class for their power and privilege (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich 1979: 17). A self serving ideology of the PMC is to envisage a technocratic takeover of society – ‘all aspects of life would be “rationalized’ according to expert knowledge’, the capitalist class would be ‘swept away to make room … for a rising class of experts’ (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich 1979: 22).
In Distinction (1989), Pierre Bourdieu theorizes class in terms of a matrix of class positions based on different forms of ‘capital’ or social power. These positions are roughly identified with job categories or economic role. One the one hand there is economic capital, which is based in material ownership and income, the kind of class power that features most strongly in the writings of Marx and Weber. On the other hand, there is cultural capital, conferred by recognized competency within the context of the socially legitimated educational apparatus. Within the same class, as defined by the ‘overall volume of capital, [there are] separate class fractions, defined by different asset structures, i.e., different distributions of their total capital among the different kinds of capital’ (Bourdieu 1989: 113).
The fractions whose reproduction depends on economic capital, usually inherited – industrial and commercial employers at the higher level, craftsmen and shopkeepers at the intermediate level – are opposed to the fractions which are least endowed (relatively, of course) with economic capital, and whose reproduction mainly depends on cultural capital – higher education and secondary teachers the higher level, primary teachers at the intermediate level. (Bourdieu 1989: 113)
Bourdieu envisages these social positions as maintained in a daily struggle in which people bring in to play the ‘habitus’ which accrues to them by virtue of their social position (Bourdieu 1989: 56). The nature of the rivalry that is of particular interest for this article is summarized:
Whereas the dominant fractions of the dominant class … incline towards a hedonistic aesthetic of ease and facility … the dominated fractions (the ‘intellectuals’ and ‘artists’) have affinities with the ascetic aspect of aesthetics and are inclined to upport all artistic revolutions conducted in the name of purity and purification, refusal of ostentation and the bourgeois taste for ornament; and the dispositions towards the social world which they owe to their status as poor relations incline them to welcome a pessimistic representation of the social world. (Bourdieu 1989: 176)
An important political aspect of Bourdieu’s analysis traces cultural affinities between the rich and the working class. They are alike in valuing the material pleasures of life, albeit at a different level of consumption, while those with cultural capital disdain these materialistic pursuits, favouring various kinds of aesthetic asceticism (1989: 214-219). Teachers ‘richer in cultural capital than in economoic capital, and therefore inclined to ascetic consumption in all areas’ are almost consciously opposed to:
… the “fat cats” gross in body and mind, who have the economic means to flaunt, with an arrogance perceived as “vulgar”, a lifestyle which remains very close to that of the working classes as regards economic and cultural consumption (Bourdieu 1989: 185).
We can treat views about the environmental crisis as also being a field in which these rivalries between classes (or class fractions) are played out. At the level of personal experience, members of the business community respond to the issue of climate change in terms of class habitus. They perceive the warnings of scientists and the instructions of environmentalists as coming from a section of society towards which they have a long standing animosity – those with high cultural capital and less economic capital than their own. From their perspective, the actions of this class cohort are only to be expected and come from the habitual asceticism and rejection of materialist pleasures that is part of the cultural armory of those with cultural capital in their struggle with the rich. They are likely to interpret any wholesale critique of the capitalist economy coming from this class as another version of the fantasy of a harmonious society run by technocrats. They see themselves allied to the working classes in a sensible appreciation of the material necessities of daily life; something that intellectuals are predisposed to ignore.
The fact that environmentalists are drawn from this section of society with high cultural capital cannot be in doubt. A number of studies have found concern for the environment to be stronger among middle class, well-educated, urban and younger populations (Tranter 1999; Strandbu and Skogen 2000; Threadgold 2012). Strandbu and Skogen (2000) point out that these values, and support for environmental protection, often align with high levels of ‘cultural capital’ as Bourdieu theorizes it (Bourdieu 1986: 243-248). Tranter points to the link between ascetic values and environmentalism (Tranter 1999). Similarly, we can have no doubt that the leading scientists who are nominating climate change as a problem are also drawn from the section of society with high cultural capital. Such class divisions have a long history in Australia, with progressive intellectuals often depicted as part of a cultural elite group who are out of touch with the broader population (Johnson 2007).
Methods
The research was carried out in the major coal mining hub of the Hunter Valley, which is home to the world’s largest coal port (Australian Coal Association 2009). The region has a long association with the coal industry through mining, power production and coal exports, but the benefits of this have recently been contested by those concerned about the health and environmental impacts of mining, including climate change (Connor et. al 2008: 77; Lewis 2012; Dean and Latta 2011; Ray and Kelly 2011). Interviews were conducted in two stages. Ten participants were involved in the initial study in early 2009, and a larger sample of 30 was collected in late 2010/ early 2011. Both sets of interviews occurred as a key piece of climate change legislation was being debated – the first during the debate about the (now failed) Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), and the second in the lead up to the introduction of the Carbon Tax to parliament. Participants were in mid-high level management positions of prominent businesses with operations in the Hunter region and were identified through local and national media, as well as industry advocacy networks. Many were CEO’s of their organisations. Interviews were semi-structured, covering the participant’s views on the public debate about climate change, government policy, practical business responses and personal opinions about the future in relation to the issue. Care was taken to ensure questions were open – ie. What do you think about the debate about climate change? Have you had any interactions with environment groups about the issue?
The majority of participants in the 2009 sample were representatives of stakeholder businesses in the climate change debate. They included: coal mining and exports (1); shipping (1); aluminium (1); aviation (1); consultancy (2); business advocacy (1); technology and science (1); climate and business advocacy (1) and natural resources (1). Initial analysis of the first sample indicated that the greenhouse intensity of the organisation – and the extent to which it was a stakeholder in the climate change debate – had a strong influence on responses. The second sample was collected with this in mind, and was intended to involve a sample of business leaders from various industries that are likely to have different priorities in relation to climate change, in order to reveal a broader understanding of the values, political beliefs and practices of business people in the data (Bryman 2004: 333-335). The resulting 2010/11 data set included people from the following industries: lawyers (2); health professional (1); insurance (1); finance (2); tourism (1); fitness (1); viticulture (1); horsebreeding (1); farming (1); coal (4); aluminium (1); business advocacy (2); construction (1); maintenance (1); infrastructure (2); aviation (1); consultancy (3); renewable energy (2); research (2).
Interviews were fully transcribed as they occurred, along with brief notes about the interview location and how it was organised. Qualitative analysis of individual transcripts was carried out to identify themes and discourses in each interview. These were cross referenced to seek out commonalities and differences amongst participants. The study maps the field of discourses to find out the range that are operated by participants. While particular themes are repeated across a number of interviews – suggesting that these positions are widely available to members of the business community – those that are divergent were also included in the analysis. As a qualitative project, the study does not provide knowledge of the predominance of particular viewpoints within the business community as a whole – the data is more suggestive than definitive.
No Support for government intervention
A key test of whether climate change, as a process of reflexive modernisation, is disrupting traditional class structures might be seen in the way business leaders are responding to legislative proposals aimed at curbing greenhouse gases. Given that the interviews were carried out under different, although similar, circumstances, the two sets of data were analysed separately on this issue. In line with many businesses public positions, the data from 2009 indicated that participants within industries that have higher greenhouse gas outputs were more resistant to legislative measures. This was not always stated up front – in fact, most participants indicated that a market mechanism aimed at reducing greenhouse gases was their preferred response to climate change (Bowden 2009). Yet participants from greenhouse intensive industries had strong conditions on their support for such measures – mostly, that trade-exposed industries should be given exemptions from the scheme in the form of free permits; greater research funding; and that the scheme only go ahead within the framework of a new global agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol (Bowden 2009). Clearly, a key moment was the failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009 to agree on any replacement for the Kyoto Protocol. The conditions presented by informants in this first study were the same as those which were stipulated by business lobby groups at the time. These conditions could be seen as leading to the ultimate failure of the CPRS. On the other side of the debate, participants from industries such as renewable energy and research were much more supportive of the CPRS, and were enthusiastic about the ability of industry to adapt to the legislation. These findings support Beck’s analysis of the split within the business community in terms of winners and losers from environmental reform. On the other hand, they also show the hegemony of those in the business community who oppose meaningful reform and in this endorse the marxist framework for analysis.
By 2010/2011 even the limited support for regulation evinced in 2009 had evaporated. Even those business leaders who were concerned about climate change were not supNporters of the carbon tax. Their opposition to the tax was focussed around economic concerns, job losses, and a general distrust of government. ‘Richard’ is the CEO of a finance organisation, which had participated in a number of government schemes to support greenhouse gas reduction and undertaken a program to reduce its own carbon footprint. When asked about the carbon tax, Richard’s main concern is that it could have an impact on employment:
Paul Howes [of the Australian Workers Union] would say, well my workers down in the Illawara would lose their jobs and you know, if they closed Port Kembla, there’d be massive unemployment in the Illawara-
Interviewer: Yeah – yeah
Um he- he- where are those jobs going to go to? Why don’t we just shove them off to Queensland, WA, some mine – fly in, fly out equivalent to shovel out some old fossil fuels a bit more quickly, is that the alternative employment that they’re likely to take? Or are there real jobs in their local community that they can do, now? I tell you what, I wouldn’t be banking on something in the solar industry given what we’ve seen in the last three years. – Richard, finance (2011)
The Australian Worker’s Union’s stance on the issue has clearly had an influence on Richard’s way of thinking about the issue, as has his previous involvement with government programs. Even for someone concerned about climate change and willing to participate in projects to mitigate it, there is not a great acceptance that alternative jobs could be found for people working in industries that may need to wind down their operations. We can also note here the alliance that is being supposed between the interests of employers and those of employees – both are concerned with matters of real material interest to ordinary people.
For ‘Lisa’, who convinced her managers to create an environmental division in her work place of which she is now head, the carbon tax is too ‘negative’ and costly:
Everything seems to be negative with this whole climate change thing, instead of, ‘you can change the world, we can all do this’, all that sort of stuff, we’re ‘oh well because of this climate change thing and all of these – you know, all of this situation – you’re going to pay more for your electricity, you’re going to pay more for your water and now we’re going to bring a carbon tax in and everyone’s going to pay more for everything’. – Lisa, maintenance (2011)
Although Lisa is passionate about the environment, she is not happy about the idea of having to pay for environmental protection. Here again, what is being emphasized is the material damage inflicted on ordinary people.
While participants who were interviewed during the CPRS debate gave some indication of support for carbon trading, there was little support for the carbon tax. This could easily be a result of the particular circumstances of the carbon tax debate. The announcement that the government would, in fact, go ahead with a carbon tax after Julia Gillard had previously stated they would not, arguably led to a heightened public debate. In addition to the arguments around the economy, participants suggested that the Prime Minister could not be trusted. This distrust was exacerbated by the fact that Labor had to capitulate to the Greens on the issue in order to form government. There were no doubt other factors. The failure of the Copenhagen summit has been mentioned. The GFC did not help, increasing concerns about business viability and employment, even in Australia. Then there were the well publicized problems with the roll out of the insulation program and the solar rebate scheme. In both cases, businesses were promised expansion into sustainable alternative industries and then this government support was recalled. But we can also note that support for a price on carbon was falling from 2006 in Australia and continued to slide right up to the present time (Hanson 2012).
It would be wrong to overemphasize changes in the extent of business opposition to a carbon price, as revealed in our data. In the 2009 study, business leaders who opposed the CPRS and were sceptical about climate change dominated the responses. The business leaders who were more favourable were drawn from renewable energy and research – a small fraction of economic activity in the region. By 2010/1011, even this marginal support for government regulation had dissipated. In both data sets, the key arguments against regulation were in terms of the likely impact on the economy, confirming the marxist analysis of business interests rather than Beck’s more optimistic prognosis.
The split in the business camp?
Within Beck’s early framework of analysis for environmental politics, we would expect the business community to be split – both in terms of businesses which benefit from fossil fuel use versus those which are damaged and in terms of businesses which benefit from fossil fuel use versus those which are at the forefront of new green technology. It is true that within our data, participants who were most concerned about climate change were generally positive about the possibilities for moving to a low carbon economy. Yet their arguments for change were focussed on the cost savings to be made with efficiency and new technology. Such an emphasis fits with the corporate sustainability model that came to prominence in the late 80s, which promotes a ‘win-win’ situation to businesses, claiming that efficient business practices will also help the environment (Young and Tilley 2006: 403). On the other hand, as we shall see, this position was used to create a united front against any actual regulation of the capitalist economy to avoid climate change.
Those business people who acknowledged climate change and were concerned expressed the opinion that economic efficiency as a route to sustainability was a preferred and ‘common sense’ approach to climate change:
Business can see that there’s money to be saved and it’ll make a difference to their bottom line so, now, it’s really worthwhile, you know what I mean – even when they, even if they don’t believe that it’s going to make a difference to the world or anything like that, it’s going to make a difference to their business – which is good. – Lisa, maintenance (2011)
It really should be a debate around ah, we have natural resources that we use, for our daily lives – those resources are finite, those resources are vital, and they’re scarce. What can we do about making them last longer? Then it doesn’t matter what causes them, it doesn’t matter what causes them at all, if you have a debate that’s framed in that way that whole – sides – disappears. – Danielle, lawyer (2011)
By reframing the debate around efficiency and sustainability, questions about climate science become superfluous. There is no need to debate the climate science. As well, there is no need for legislation because business just need to be educated about the advantages for their bottom line. The issue is to preserve resources – which no doubt would help business make more money. Here, interviewees supported the analysis of Beck in looking forward to the market opportunities of Green business, while at the same time, they marshalled this analysis to reject the imposition of a carbon tax. So, green alternatives for business are posed hypothetically as the way to move forward – but as a means of opposing the actual control of global capital that is being proposed through the carbon tax.
Looking at other business leaders, who were in fact opposed to the whole concept of climate change, we can see how they took up these themes to present their own views as moderately pro-environment:
[D]on’t get necessarily hung up on whether there is climate change or not. Does it make sense to be doing something to capture the carbon and do something with it? So it’s about, in my view, sustainability. I think that personally we need to be quite careful about branding everything climate change. What I am convinced of – personally and it’s good business practice as well – is not to waste precious resources. – Paul, shipping (2009)
What I do believe in is minimising footprint. Ah on the environment – ok. That’s a good thing to do. Minimise our footprint, maximise the efficiency of our industrial processes. Minimise waste, ah – um maximise ah the ongoing ah – ongoing support of ecology. And all those things, all those things that are traditional green things I believe in. I – I really hate this, the lies and the fear that comes from the greenhouse – supposed greenhouse effect. – Anthony, consultant (2011)
So while these two sides of business might have differing views about climate change, this issue does not ‘split the business camp’ as Beck proposes. Instead, the ‘win-win’ approach provided by ‘sustainability’ functions to allow shades of antagonism to regulation to share a common perspective. ‘Anthony’ is fiercely sceptical about whether climate change is caused by greenhouse gases but is happy to support ‘ecology’ and ‘traditional green things’; Paul, who is also sceptical, is very approving of ‘sustainability’ as a brand – it is only climate change and the greenhouse effect that they object to. What this suggests is that the business community is not in fact split into camps for and against ‘ecological modernisation’. Instead, the promise of ecological modernisation becomes a hegemonic model for resistance to any effective climate change proposal. The marxist model of class politics fits this very well.
In this context, those business people who may believe in the reality of climate change voluntarily abdicate this ground for making claims about policy – declaring that this issue is not important if a ‘win win’ is to be found. What this allows is a process in which those advocating actual regulation are presented as extreme. Instead, measures that will have no detrimental impact on business or consumers are seen as adequate to the problem. Julie puts it like this:
[Before the Stern report] you didn’t have much of a lighter green I guess it’s being termed now, you’re either light green or dark green (laugh) along the scale depending on where you fit in your attitudes to environmental activism. You know I guess there are community groups and organisations out there who are on the extreme side. And there are others who just look at the economic side of things and there are others who are a bit more neutral, and I guess that’s what [organisation] is – considering all, all action that needs to be rational, kind of, not be detrimental to businesses or to households, needs to have minimum impact on your life, but just be more aware of what you’re doing. – Julie, climate change and business advocate (2009)
What is significant about this framework for dealing with climate change is that there is no course of action that can be taken in the case where environmental protection and economic growth come into conflict. Thus, when it becomes clear that legislation such as the carbon tax is going to be implemented, support for it does not necessarily follow concern about climate change. As Julie says, those who would argue that environmental concerns should take priority over the economy are at the extreme, or ‘dark green’ end of the spectrum.
The attempt to reframe the debate around economic interests gives an indication that Beck’s threat that the business community could split over such problems is yet to be realised. Rather, participants who are aware that their peers have differing views about the science of climate change make an effort to avoid having that discussion. By appealing to a shared set of values, they argue that it is possible to continue our affluent lifestyle without making major changes. Concurrently, participants are keen to distance themselves from more radical proposals from environmentalists.
Views of environmentalists and scientists
In establishing this business consensus, environmentalists and climate change scientists are constituted in very negative terms. The views of interviewees fit well with the analysis of class and class fractions performed by the Ehrenreichs and Bourdieu.
Environmentalists are depicted as unrealistic, unreasonable, and irrational. They are supposed to lack a realistic economic perspective. Even interviewees who were concerned about climate change were not always supportive of those campaigning on the issue. At best, environmentalists are seen as naïve and emotive:
This morning I was listening to Climate Action Newcastle who are going down to Sydney today to lobby for a 100% renewable energy target by 2020. I mean that would be fantastic, that would be wonderful, but it’s just not going to happen. It’s just not practically possible. – Joe, business advocate (2009)
The Greens are bad. You know they’ve got their little group of experts talking about the same issues in these debates and I think the Greens are always really emotive – that’s very easy to dismiss, you can then dismiss their message, you know, if they’re not presenting their arguments on economic – and a rational basis, for business, it’s too easy to dismiss them. It’s just about the emotive – radical – fringe. – Danielle, lawyer (2011)
Again, this framing of the climate change debate fits with the perspective of those who argue against government legislation to reduce greenhouse gases:
There seems to be this religious fervour – about climate change … So long as they’re reporting the facts – um and not just spinning all their, using emotional arguments as, as their canvas. – Amanda, coal (2009)
Such comments are reminiscent of the sceptical commentators, who often depict environmentalists as ‘deviant – as deluded crackpots and antisocial misfits who cannot be trusted and may even represent a threat to society’ (Jennaway 2008: 70). In terms of the class politics that Bourdieu describes, the materialist position is the rational one whereas any kind of questioning of that is ‘emotional’ and effeminate, terms which are also used to describe the artistic bent of those with high cultural capital. It can also be characterised as religious in that it is ‘other worldly’. The values that animate it are not the real material values which run the world, they are attempts to get away from that reality. The dismissive ‘their little group of experts’ is designed to call into question the scientific basis of claims made by those with high cultural capital. These claims must be discounted because they are misleadingly presented as being based in science; in fact they are motivated by a ‘religious’ rejection of material needs.
Interestingly, similar arguments are made about climate scientists, the experts who come from within the section of society with high cultural capital and provide arguments for the environmentalist lobby group to attack the material interests which dominate in the real economy. ‘Paul’ and ‘James’ see scientists, like their environmental counterparts, as being religious in their pursuits:
One of the things that shocked me… is the brutalness of scientists for their own mantra, their own methodology, that this is the only way – and their ability to sword someone else of their fellow scientists who doesn’t agree… I find the fundamentalism of the scientists to be actually breathtaking. – Paul, shipping (2009)
It’s science meets religion… there’s a bit of a mantra that’s hard to break. – James, water supply (2009)
Paul undermines the claim of those with high cultural capital to speak on the basis of neutral knowledge. This is just a front beneath which lies naked self interest. In this they are no different from the materialist elite that they are trying to undermine. Their predisposition to find fault with materialism is like a religion in that it is not based on any kind of neutral rationality. Scientists and their environmentalist followers, then, are put by these participants into the same frame: caught up in the fervour about climate change, they are not being rational, possibly not even scientific in their methods. Rather than objectively seeking knowledge for its social or intrinsic value, Paul and John sees scientists as taking advantage of the current concern for climate change:
I’d love someone to actually get the scientists to bank their house on what they’re predicting… I’m very sceptical of scientists, of universities, because it’s about funding and research and boy here’s a new topic where I get into it. – Paul, shipping (2009)
Interviewer: and where are those sorts of ideas [about climate change] coming from?
Oh. I would only guess but I would think that they’re being driven by the environmental groups and by politicians. With self interest. (int: OK). See even with research Um the essence with research is ‘I want to get a certain result, so this is how I’m doing my research’. – John, finance (2011)
Paul reinforces his other comments by pointing out that the scientists are part of an economically privileged group that is merely pretending to put moral concerns in front of material interests. Their real motivations are research grants and self-interest. They are not people who would actually bet their own house on it, or understand what is at risk as a result of their proposals. In fact, their claims are depicted as moral posturing (Bourdieu 1989: 256).
Environmentalists, too, have questionable motivations. ‘Steven’ is the CEO of a coal mining company, who has been following the debate about the potential health impacts of coal dust in the region.
I don’t think probably people in Sydney really give a toss for the health of people in Singleton, or the dust that people in Singleton might have to put up with, and I’m not saying that we accept that there is a problem there … but ah it’s much more about um the role of ah coal mining as a contributor in their eyes to – to climate change. I think that is the single biggest issue at their level … Um and it’s much easier to be quite, um – I won’t say holier than thou – it’s quite easier to be, to condemn etc. when you’re actually removed from the realities of, of the benefits that mining brings to, to local regions – they don’t see those benefits, they don’t experience those benefits. – Steven, coal (2010)
Steven invokes the city/rural divide between the nation’s largest city, Sydney, and Singleton, a town in the Hunter region, to argue that environmentalists are taking advantage of local concerns about mining to promote the issue of climate change. The phrase ‘holier than thou’ fits exactly with Bourdieu’s descriptions of the viewpoints of those with economic capital where those with cultural capital are concerned. This intellectual elite hypocritically forgets their own material well being while attempting to undermine the material power of the rich – their real game. In the meantime they forget that what they propose could reduce the real material well being of the ordinary populace.
What we can also see in these interviews is a sense that what is proposed by environmentalists lies outside of the framework of current politics. In relation to Ehrenreichs’ analysis, what is proposed is nothing less than a complete overhaul of the class structure of civilisation; something that could lead to profound social upheaval:
We will have social anarchy if we implement the environmental call to stop coal. – Paul, shipping (2009)
The rejection of coal energy was something that could be dismissed as a utopian fantasy – what you would expect of a group of people who have had little experience of ‘running the economy’:
People are living in la la land if they think [coal’s] going to be gone overnight. – Julie, climate change and business advocate (2009)
The defense of materialism
Alienating people who are seen to be responsible for climate mitigation policies leaves a space for the interviewees to appeal to the ‘ordinary’ person. Interviewees actively defend materialist values and the growth economy. Like sustainability, this is depicted as a ‘common sense’ approach that is shared, globally, across society:
I go to you and say – I will double your bill. I will triple your bill. Your electricity bill. What will you say?
Interviewer: I’ll say there’s not enough money-
You will say, ‘no I don’t want that’. – Frank, aluminium (2009)
Those people [in China] have a real – they want a lifestyle the same as what we have in Australia … and one part of me says that ‘is that an unreasonable request, seeing that we have that?’ And I know people say well ‘no, you can’t have that because you’ll harm the planet’ and they say – ‘well, is that fair that you have it, and you want us not to have it?’ – James, water supply (2009)
Inherent in participants’ comments is a belief in the right of all people to consume at the same level of those in richer countries – a right they see as being under threat if climate mitigation policies are implemented.
Concerns about lifestyle are intrinsically linked to the other major argument against climate mitigation policies – that they might cost jobs. As seen above in the case of Richard, this emphasis has had major resonance in the climate change debate.
I mean Tomago [aluminium], it’s got 1,200 employees but it’s got another 3 or 4 thousand in suppliers, you know people engaged in supplying. I mean that’s a huge social impact the day that that company decides to close. It’s a huge impact. What do we do? I mean 5,000 people. – Joe, business advocate (2009)
Maybe I’ve got my head in the sand but it, if it [the coal industry] does [close], there’s, there’s, there’ll be serious problems.
Interviewer: What sort of problems?
Jobs. You know. So. – Peter, consulting (2009)
Beck argues that environmental risks engender political conflicts which do not conform to the old labour versus capital political dynamic (Beck 1995b). A typical scenario is that those who benefit from the production of the risk are situated on the same side – as the workers and owners in a particular industry. For those who have been profiting from the use of fossil fuels, divisions around the ownership of capital are put aside in order to defend the system against environmentalists, Green politicians and scientists. But what we also have here are the class politics specified by Bourdieu. Business leaders put themselves on the same side as workers – with both opposed to the environmentalists who lack an understanding of the importance of basic material needs.
This alliance examined
As we have seen, business leaders stand as defenders of the working class. They are supposedly allied to protect the economy and jobs from unrealistic environmentalists and self-interested scientists. This alliance is in part wishful thinking, but there is an element of truth in it.
It is certainly true that the critique of environmentalists as an elite who do not take into account the material realities of life is shared by many working class members of the public. Gow and Leahy’s 2003 survey in this same Hunter region found that ‘56 percent [of respondents] agreed that environmentalists “do not know a lot about the issues they demonstrate over and … forget that other people’s jobs may be involved”; [while] 29 percent disagreed’ (Gow and Leahy 2005: 132). On the other hand, when interviewed about environmental problems residents from the Hunter region expressed a concern about environmental issues which was just as extreme as that of the environmentalists that these business leaders condemn; returning a range of 60 – 90 percent of ‘concerned’ or ‘very concerned’ in response to questions about environmental problems (Gow and Leahy 2005: 124). As well, they blamed business (and government) for these problems; 76 percent thought those who build and run factories and cut down forests cause dangerous pollution; 96 percent thought businesses should pay for the environmental damage they cause (Gow and Leahy 2005:126-7).
Whether similar levels of concern about the environment would be registered in the Hunter today is a moot point. In Australia at large, the temporary support for the CPRS has dissipated with steeply falling levels of support for any kind of carbon pricing and consequent political damage to the Labor party. The Lowy Institute has conducted polls on global warming since 2006. The statement most consistent with political support for strong measures is that ‘Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs’ (Hanson 2012: 6). Support for this position has dropped from 68% in 2006 to 48% by 2009 and 36% by 2012 (Hanson 2012:6). Those polled in 2012 were mostly opposed to the carbon tax (63%). Only 35% were in favour. Those against the tax were more concerned with potential job losses than any other issue (Hanson 2012: 5). This change should not be seen as indicating that the mass of the people actually believe that business leaders can be trusted to save the environment. It is more likely that they do not trust environmentalists to look after the material interests of ordinary people.
So while business leaders assume the reality of this alliance, it seems more likely that the public at large distrusts business people and environmentalists in equal measure. The reality is that these business leaders are insulated from the real experiences of others, just as they imply environmentalists and scientists are. When the business leaders of this study defend the rights of all to enjoy material wealth they seem to forget the current realities of inequality – between both business and the working class, as well rich and poor nations. Internationally, climate change negotiations have had a strong focus on social and intergenerational justice. Climate change is seen as damaging the poor (Smith 2007; Paavola 2008). This makes participants’ claims for social justice in relation to emission reductions appear somewhat dubious. Neverthless, this powerful framing of the climate change debate by business and industry as an economic, rather than environmental, issue has impacted greatly on the effectiveness of government in attempting to introduce policies such as the CPRS and the Carbon Tax.
Some conclusions
The lack of qualitative data on business leaders’ attitudes to climate change makes any national comparison of the data presented here problematic. In April 2011 the Sydney Morning Herald attempted to survey the top 50 ASX companies in Australia on their support for the carbon tax, and only received 23 responses. Of those, while 12 were positive, the authors noted that ‘support was heavily qualified with a growing list of demands for compensation’ (Yeates and Murphy 2011: 10). It is certainly likely that to some extent, the arguments in the Hunter region around climate change have caused some participants to be somewhat protective of the business community in the region. As a regional study, the results of this research can only be seen as identifying some of the discourses around climate change operated by business leaders in the Hunter. While these discourses are readily available in the public – in the columns of conservative journalists – further research is needed to ascertain the extent to which they are employed nationally.
What is clear from this research is that the pursuit of emissions reductions to ecologically modernize industry is far from a pervasive view in this business community. Although there is some differentiation amongst participants about the science of climate change itself, this rarely translates into a call for a legislative response to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There is a hegemonic response to the issue which defends business against the machinations of scientists and environmentalists and sides with the supposed views of the working class and the poor of the world in preferring jobs to schemes supported by holier than thou scientists and environmentalists. Interviewees for this research do not emphasise the potential threats that climate change might pose to the ongoing functioning of the economy. Rather, participants who are concerned about climate change draw on the sustainability model of efficiency to argue their case, which severely limits the extent to which they accept the need for legislation such as the carbon tax.
The framing of class in the work of the Ehrenreichs and Bourdieu is very helpful in mapping the antagonism between business leaders and the two social groups that are calling for tough action on the environment. It is a typical standoff between those with high cultural capital and those with high material capital, or between the PMC and the capitalist class. The former defend asceticism and the higher values of life while the latter defend material comforts. Certainly, this is how business leaders see the issues. Scientists and environmentalists are considered to be typical of cultural elites – people employed in comfortable, secure occupations, influencing policy from ‘on high’ but with no real understanding of the importance of material well-being in people’s everyday lives (Johnson 2007: 196). The interviewees, by contrast construct themselves as sympathetic to the desire for comfort, convenience and growth, shared by the population at large. Extending the same argument to the international arena, participants express concern about the rights of developing nations such as China and India to grow. They suppose a shared materialism; a practical and sensible desire for comfort that only cultural elites, already in a materially comfortable position, could challenge. In this regard, participants position themselves as having more concern for social justice issues than their environmental and scientific counterparts.
The possibility that scientists and environmentalists are correct about the science is buried by participants’ reaction to what they see as a typical asceticism coming from those with high cultural capital. Even those who are also concerned about climate change do not want to defend the science, or even really discuss the issue. Yet creating a discourse in which environmentalists and scientists are not to be relied upon for guidance on responding to climate change makes it difficult to accept that the problem requires something like a carbon tax. Indeed, it creates a space in which business leaders who are more sceptical about climate change can strenuously argue against the legislation. Rather than a split within the business community, as Beck and others have predicted, the research in this article shows that even those who are concerned about the environment and climate change are extremely cautious in accepting any costs associated with environmental protection. Within such a rigid discourse, there is little surprise that the Carbon Tax, and Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme before it, were met with such fervent opposition.
Tainter (1998: 50) asks an important question in considering why advanced civilisations may collapse, having ignored pressing environmental issues: how can a collapse take place in a complex society where the whole administrative apparatus is set up to monitor and control the economy and take note of changes that threaten the flow of wealth? Here we can see a partial answer to this conundrum for our society. The function of monitoring the flow of wealth in capitalism has been delegated to a subordinated professional managerial class. This class has its own power base in knowledge (cultural capital) and is in a de facto contestation with the ruling class; a struggle that reveals itself in numerous everyday disputes over taste and values. In these disputes, the ruling class defends the pragmatic good sense of a materialist perspective while the professional managerial class defends ascetic or altruistic positions. The ultimate fantasy of the professional managerial class seems to be to replace today’s management by self interested materialists with truly efficient technologically informed management. In this context it is no wonder that claims that the whole energy and transport infrastructure must be rewritten and that growth itself must be questioned are seen as predictable offerings from those with high cultural capital, defending their class interests. It is difficult for business leaders to see these spokespersons for the environmentalist movement as truly disinterested. This is certainly the sense that we get from reading our interview material. Environmentalists and scientists alike are accused of being out of touch with the material aspirations of ordinary citizens, of being unrealistic about what is economically possible, of masking grubby self interest beneath a cloak of altruistic concern, of being fundamentalist about environmental matters, a stance which is religious in its divorce from the material world. To really take on board what environmentalists and scientists are saying about global warming is radically opposed to the ‘habitus’ of business leaders.
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